The problem on the desk
Can an inspector improve a non-constant-sum inspection outcome by announcing a mixed inspection policy in advance? Maschler examined leadership in a game where the other player has already promised to fulfil a duty.1
A life in moments
- 1927
Jerusalem
Born on 22 July.2
- 1956
Hebrew University of Jerusalem · Jerusalem
Completed his doctorate and joined the faculty.2
- 1964
Published the bargaining-set work with Robert Aumann.3
- 1966
Princeton University / Hebrew University of Jerusalem · Princeton / Jerusalem
Published the inspector-leadership paper.4
- 1995
Published Repeated Games with Incomplete Information with Aumann.3
- 2008
Jerusalem
Died on 20 July.5
Every line rests on a dated source (numbered below) unless it carries a mark: R for an inference, S for a story as told.
In their own words
the inspector can announce his mixed strategy in advance
A story
From complex analysis to games
Maschler completed a dissertation in complex analysis. At the Hebrew University he met the newly recruited Aumann; their collaboration drew him into game theory and continued for decades.6
Around Maschler
- co-author Robert J. Aumann Co-authored the bargaining-set work and the 1995 repeated-games book.3
- exchange Melvin Dresher The inspector-leadership article explicitly cites Dresher’s earlier inspection model.8
Advisors in the record Stefan Bergman, Michael Fekete Students in the record Nimrod Megiddo, Anna Sfard, Ein-Ya Gura Mathematics Genealogy Project record
The genealogy lists only what the database records; a missing name is not a missing teacher.
The card in the book
Mathematician at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In cooperative game theory he introduced, with Robert Aumann, the bargaining set and, with Morton Davis, the kernel. With Aumann, in collaboration with Richard Stearns, he developed repeated games with incomplete information in a research project reported to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1965–1968. His papers on the inspector's non-constant-sum game studied inspector leadership — an inspection policy announced in advance — including how the result depends on the way the inspectee resolves indifference.
Main works “The bargaining set for cooperative games”, with R. J. Aumann (1964); “The kernel of a cooperative game”, with M. Davis (NRLQ 12, 1965); “A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non-constant-sum game” (NRLQ 13, 1966); Repeated Games with Incomplete Information, with R. J. Aumann, in collaboration with R. E. Stearns (1995); Game Theory, with E. Solan and S. Zamir (2013).
To read further
- Michael Maschler (1927–2008), Robert J. Aumann; Game Theory Society (2008) · colleague’s obituary
Sources (8)
- A price leadership method for solving the inspector’s non-constant-sum game, Michael Maschler, 1966; Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 13(1), pp. 11–33; abstract and references
- Michael B. Maschler, INFORMS; Brief Biography and Selected Publications
- Michael B. Maschler, INFORMS; Selected Publications
- A price leadership method for solving the inspector’s non-constant-sum game, Michael Maschler, 1966; Author affiliation and publication date
- Michael Maschler (1927–2008), Robert J. Aumann; Game Theory Society, 2008; 30 July; opening paragraph
- Michael B. Maschler, INFORMS; Brief Biography
- A price leadership method for solving the inspector’s non-constant-sum game, Michael Maschler, 1966; Abstract, second paragraph; excerpt
- A price leadership method for solving the inspector’s non-constant-sum game, Michael Maschler, 1966; Reference 1
The facts on this page were gathered for the site from the sources listed, each checked against its locator; the book's card is reproduced unchanged.