Chapter 4 · Signals, Disclosure, and Persuasion
A. Michael Spence
born 1943
Photograph: Robert Scoble, Michael Spence, 23 January 2008, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 2.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/). Shown toned. File and licence
The problem on the desk
An employer cannot directly observe a new applicant’s productivity. Spence asked how observable, costly choices could convey information, and what patterns of wages and educational investment would sustain that interpretation.1
A life in moments
- 1943
Montclair
Born in 1943.2
- 1966
Princeton University · Princeton
Completed a bachelor’s degree in philosophy.3
- 1968
University of Oxford · Oxford
Completed his mathematics studies.3
- 1972
Harvard University · Cambridge
Completed his economics doctorate on market signalling.4
- 1973
Stanford University · Stanford
Joined Stanford’s faculty for his first appointment there.5
- 1990
Stanford Graduate School of Business · Stanford
Became dean; served through 1999.5
- 2001
Shared the economics prize with George Akerlof and Joseph Stiglitz.2
Every line rests on a dated source (numbered below) unless it carries a mark: R for an inference, S for a story as told.
In their own words
To hire someone, then, is frequently to purchase a lottery.
A story
The paper begins by signalling
Spence opens his 1973 article by considering his own relationship with the reader. A writer expecting future readers has different incentives from someone appearing only once. He then turns to job applicants who rarely return to the same market.6
Around Spence
- doctoral advisor Kenneth J. Arrow MGP records Arrow as one of Spence’s doctoral advisors.8
- doctoral advisor Thomas C. Schelling MGP records Schelling as one of Spence’s doctoral advisors.8
Advisors in the record Kenneth Joseph Arrow, Thomas Crombie Schelling Students in the record Martin Perry Mathematics Genealogy Project record
The genealogy lists only what the database records; a missing name is not a missing teacher.
The card in the book
Economist who studied at Princeton, Oxford and Harvard, where he received his doctorate. He developed the theory of market signalling — how an informed party can credibly convey its type by an action that is costlier for other types — and taught at Harvard and Stanford, where he was dean of the Graduate School of Business. He shared the 2001 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with George Akerlof and Joseph Stiglitz for analyses of markets with asymmetric information.
Main works “Job market signaling” (Quarterly Journal of Economics 87, 1973); Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes (1974).
To read further
- Professor A Michael Spence, Chinese University of Hong Kong (2004) · institutional biography
Sources (8)
- Job Market Signaling, Michael Spence, 1973; pp. 356–358
- The Prize in Economic Sciences 2001: press release, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2001; Biographical paragraph for A. Michael Spence; award statement
- Professor A Michael Spence, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2004; Education and academic career
- Job Market Signaling, Michael Spence, 1973; p. 355, first footnote
- Michael Spence, Stanford Graduate School of Business; Biography; indexed institutional text
- Job Market Signaling, Michael Spence, 1973; p. 355, Introduction
- Job Market Signaling, Michael Spence, 1973; p. 356; “lottery” in the technical decision-theory sense
- Mathematics Genealogy Project: 201552, Mathematics Genealogy Project; Degree, advisor and student table
The facts on this page were gathered for the site from the sources listed, each checked against its locator; the book's card is reproduced unchanged.